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Abstract 
Using annual urban household survey data from 6 provinces in different regions of 
China, we analyze the rapid increase in earning inequality of urban China from 1988 to 2003. 
We describe overall and residual inequality trends and use quantile regression to address the 
relationship between education and earning inequality. We find that returns to education are 
higher for the low earning individuals in the first half of this period conditional on their 
observable characteristics. This suggests that education has a negative impact upon 
within-group earning inequality. However, the situation is reversed during the recent half 
period. Using the Quantile-JMP decomposition technique we partition the observed 
distribution of earnings into ‘price’ components (earning coefficients) and ‘quantity’ 
components (labor force composition) and calculate, through simulation, the impact of 
education on changes in overall earning dispersion. The decomposition shows that the rise of 
earning dispersion between 1988 and 2003 is almost entirely accounted for by prices rather 
than quantities, and it attributes a large proportion to the overall effect of education. From 
1988 to1997 education serves as the equalizing force to decrease earning inequality but it is 
the primary driving force which increases the earning inequality between 1997 and 2003. The 
empirical analysis also reveals that the overall effect of college and above education category 
on the growth of earning inequality is the most pronounced one. 
Key words: Return to education; earning inequality; quantile regression 
JEL codes: C29; J31; I21 1. Introduction 
Since the late 1970s China’s centrally-planned economy has undergone a gradual 
transition towards a market economy. In the mid-1980s, the emphasis of this reform switched 
from rural areas to the urban areas. Its transition gradually changed many aspects of the 
Chinese economy. Labor market reforms are often implemented in combination with other 
major reforms that promote open product market competition, greater managerial autonomy, 
and restructuring of state-owned enterprises. To introduce incentives and efficiency into the 
labor market, government permitted relaxation of the extreme egalitarian wage policies of the 
past. In the early stage of economic transition however, the urban labor reforms had not 
proceeded very far. The move had been towards decentralization of labor management 
rather than towards a properly functioning labor market. Many wages appeared to be 
governed institutionally or by ability to pay rather than by market forces. Substantial 
liberalization of the labor market occurred during the rapid growth episode that followed 
Deng’s southern trip in 1992. During this period, many workers left state employment to jump 
into the ocean of the free market (xiahai) and many state-owned units expanded into a range 
of commercial activities. Finally, beginning in 1997, the government moved forward with 
aggressive restructuring and privatization of state-owned enterprises, leading to substantial 
layoffs, retirements, and exits from the labor force (Giles, Park, and Cai, 2003).   
Accompanying rapid economic growth, China has experienced one of the fastest 
increases in income inequality ever recorded. 
1 The rapid growth of income inequality is not 
only a potential hazard to China’s political stabilization and sustainable economic growth; it is 
also closely related to poverty reduction because an increase in inequality may increase 
poverty whereas an increase in average income may decrease poverty
2 It is critical to both 
policy makers and academic researchers to find out the trend and causes of earnings inequality 
                                                        
1 The World Bank (1997) finds that China’s overall Gini coefficient grew from 0.288 in 1981 to 0.388 in 
1995, from 0.176 to 0.275 in urban areas and from 0.242 to 0.333 in rural areas. Khan and Riskin 
(1998) report that the overall Gini coefficient grew from 0.382 in 1988 to 0.452 in 1995, from 0.233 to 
0.332 in urban areas and from 0.338 to 0.416 in rural areas. Using the entire sample covered by the 
National Bureau of Statistics, Meng et. al. (2004) and Ravallion and Chen (2004) show a rise from 0.20 
to 0.32 between 1986 and 2000. 
2 Theoretically speaking, poverty reduction will be hampered by rising inequality and enhanced by 
income growth, ceteris paribus. Araar and Timothy (2006) explored the link between poverty and 
inequality. 
  3in China to better understand and instruct interventions aiming at poverty alleviation. 
A closely related issue is the role played by education in the evolution of earning 
inequality. After witnessing major increases in the spread of earnings since the early 1980s,
3 
some western decision-makers have portrayed schooling as the best tool to erode the 
supposedly globalization-related forces that increase earning inequality. As Topel (1997, p. 
72) put it, “reason for interest in supply effects stems from the hopes that human capital 
investment will mitigate future inequality”, while Johnson (1997, P. 53) suggested that “a 
long-term commitment to increasing greatly the fraction of individuals who go to college is the 
appropriate public policy response to the phenomenon of increasing inequality”.   
Although preliminary evidence
4 shows that rising returns to education is an important 
contributor to rising inequality, emerging evidence reveals that aggregate earning inequality 
is due not only to differences in educational attainment but also to disparities within each 
educational group, which implies that skill differentials not captured by formal schooling is 
important. These may include on-the-job training, over-education or innate ability.   
Theoretically, the effect of education on earning inequality is a combination of quantity, 
quality, and price effects. These effects work through the following channels. On the one 
hand, increasing the proportion of college-educated individuals in the workforce puts more 
weight, ceteris paribus, on a sub-distribution of wages exhibiting both higher mean and higher 
dispersion, and this should increase measured wage inequality. Further, increasing the 
proportion of the college-educated among the college-age population should increase skill 
heterogeneity among college graduates and this should widen the corresponding 
sub-distribution of wages, thereby increasing overall wage inequality. On the other hand, 
increased skill (and ability) heterogeneity may also lower the average college premium, which 
would lower wage inequality. Finally and perhaps more importantly, to the extent that the 
demand for highly educated workers does not outstrip supply, the increased proportion of 
college-educated persons should put downward pressure on the college premium and lower 
wage inequality. The net result of these effects is certainly an empirical question and 
                                                        
3 See Katz and Murphy (1992) and Juhn et al. (1993) for a description of the US case and some 
tentative explanations. 
4  Gustafsson and Li (2000), Knight and Song (2003), Zhang et al. (2005). 
  4constitutes the major motivation for this project. 
A full understanding of this issue requires disentangling the effects of changes in 
education attainment from the effects of changes in returns to education. Given different 
forces working in different directions, characterizing the relative importance of the quantity 
and price component of education in the evolution of Chinese earnings inequality is an 
important empirical exercise. Despite extensive research on China’s income and earnings 
distribution, little attention is paid to this important aspect. 
In this paper, we document changes in the structure of labor earnings in urban China 
over the period 1988-2003. Our analysis is based on micro data from China’s National 
Bureau of Statistics (NBS). The relatively long span of the dataset allows us to trace out 
changes in the structure of earnings for an extended period of time. We focus on earnings
5 
rather than income in order to better evaluate the performance of the formal labor market. 
Despite some limitations (which we discuss below), the large-sample repeated 
cross-sectional data make it possible to go considerably beyond existing studies in analyzing 
the sources and timing of earning inequality changes in post-reform China. In particular, we 
examine the importance of education - both the rising returns to schooling and the advances 
in educational attainments – on the patterns of earning inequality for males and females.   
In the next section of the paper we review prior work on the distribution of earnings in 
China. In section 3 we describe the dataset used in our analysis. Section 4 contains our 
analysis of changes in earnings inequality, and section 5 contains our estimates of human 
capital functions and an analysis of changes in the structure of earnings during the transition. 
Section 6 concludes. 
2.  Prior Research on Earnings Distributions in China 
The widening income distribution in urban China is one of the most remarkable shifts 
in the structure of labor compensation in the country’s labor market since Chinese economic 
reform commenced in 1979. This phenomenon has attracted much attention from economists 
                                                        
5 Ideally, the hourly wage rate should be used rather than earnings. But the Urban Household Survey 
conducted by NBS did not provide information on hours of work until 2002. Hence, the earnings we 
derived in the paper are annual data rather than hourly or weekly data. 
  5and there have been quite a lot research done on this topic. 
Earlier work on China’s earnings distribution has relied on aggregate statistics that are 
released annually by the NBS. Where micro data are available, researchers calculated 
summary measures of income inequality such as Gini and Theil coefficient and employed the 
regression-based decomposition method. 
The two well-known papers on income distribution in China are Zhao et al. (1994) and 
Zhao, Li and Riskin (1999), in which the trend of income inequality is implicitly documented. 
Many other studies have provided good insight into the extent and cause of this trend. Knight 
and Song (1991, 2003) found that the regional differences and human capital factors such as 
the worker’s education levels, work experiences, and occupation-specific skills are important 
contributors to the rising urban income inequality from 1988 to 1995; Meng (2004) suggested 
that the large-scale unemployment and the subsequent emergence of the very poor 
population contributed to rising urban inequality during 1995-1999, the period known by the 
radical reform. In addition, several authors have examined the income gap between male and 
female workers (Gustafsson and Li, 2000; Liu et al, 2000; Maurer-Fazio et al, 1999, 2002; 
Meng, 1998a, 1998b; Wang and Cai, 2005; Ng 2007). These studies mainly focused on those 
summary measures of inequality such as the Gini and Theil coefficients, and the 
decomposition methodology they employed were based on OLS regressions. 
Recent developments in the research on earning inequality emphasize estimating the 
entire wage distribution and decomposing the changes of the distribution (see for example: 
DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996), Machado and Mata (2005); Autor, Katz, and Kearney 
(2005); Melly (2005, 2006). This distributional approach provides comprehensive responses 
to questions such as whether earnings are more dispersed among the high earners (at the 
top half of earning distribution) or low earners (at the lower half of earning distribution), or 
whether the inequality is driven by the presence of the extreme high earners or low earners. 
Moreover, the distribution-based decomposition is more general than the decomposition of 
specific earning inequality indexes.   
Most of the prior research focused on the experience of the U.S. or other developed 
countries, while several researchers applied the distribution-based decomposition method to 
  6the transition countries. For instance, Gangulin and Terrell (2006) examined the rising income 
inequality in Ukraine using the Lemieux method (Lemieux, 2002), and Pham and Reilly (2006) 
applied the Machado-Mata quantile regression decomposition method to examine the gender 
pay gap in Vietnam. As far as we know, there are few studies that have adopted the 
distributional approach to examine earning inequality in China. 
Our study makes potential contributions to the literature in the following three aspects. 
First and foremost, the micro data sets used in our analysis are composed of sixteen 
consecutive annual surveys conducted by China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). The 
large-sample repeated cross-sectional data make it possible to go considerably beyond 
existing studies in analyzing the sources and timing of earning inequality changes in 
post-reform China. Secondly, we employed the distribution-based decomposition approach 
which has some advantages over the traditional method but is rarely used in analysis on 
transition economies. Such an approach is able to provide a more comprehensive picture of 
the earning dispersion in urban China and investigate the causes of rising inequality. This 
constitutes our main contribution to the literature. Thirdly, we examine the importance of 
education, both the rising returns to schooling and the advances in educational attainment, to 
the patterns of earning inequality for males and females. Given different forces work in 
different directions, characterizing the relative importance of the quantity and price 
components of education in the evolution of earnings inequality in urban China is an 
important empirical exercise. However, little attention is paid to this relevant aspect in income 
and earnings distribution literature on China. Since both the methodology and the topic 
discussed fill an important gap on the theme, we believe this paper will enrich literature on 
China’s labor market. 
3. The  dataset 
Data used in this paper come from 16 consecutive annual surveys, from 1988 through 
2003. The survey provides detailed information on household size, employment status, 
income, consumption, savings, cash holdings, and demand for goods and housing. The 
respondents are chosen to be representative of the populace in over 220 cities and towns of 
various sizes and various regions in China. This survey is conducted by the Urban Survey 
  7Organization of the National Bureau of Statistics; it covers 146 cities and 80 towns. The 
choice of cities, towns and households is based on the principle of random and 
representative sampling. According to the 2002 Handbook of Chinese Urban Household 
Survey (the National Bureau of Statistics, 2001), the sampling method is consistent over all 
survey years. 
The National Bureau of Statistics (2001, NBS hereinafter) provides further details on 
the survey and data. To assess the representativeness of the data, we compare several 
variables that are both available in our data and in the Statistical Yearbook of China. For 1988, 
our sample averages for household size, the number of workers in a household, and the per 
capita household income are 3.7, 2.2 and 1,352, respectively, while the corresponding 
national averages are 3.6, 2.0 and 1,192 (Statistical Yearbook of China, 1989, p.726). For 
2001, our sample averages for the three variables are 3.2, 1.8 and 7,763, whereas the 
national averages of 3.1, 1.7 and 6,907 (Statistical Yearbook of China, 2002, p.321). Thus, 
the sample averages are reasonably close to those reported in the statistical yearbooks. To 
give a fair representation of the whole urban Chinese labor market, we choose the following 
six provinces:
6 Beijing, Guangdong, Liaoning, Shaanxi, Sichuan, and Zhejiang. These six 
provinces are roughly representative of China’s different regions. Beijing is a rapidly growing 
municipality in North-Central China, while Guangdong and Zhejiang are dynamic economic 
provinces standing in the East-coastal and South-coastal areas. Liaoning is a heavy-industry 
province in the Northeast. Shaanxi and Sichuan are relatively less developed provinces in the 
Northwest and Southwest, respectively.   
The income and expenditure data are based on self-recorded diaries reported 
monthly, and hence are likely to be more accurate than recall surveys. Earnings are defined 
to include basic earnings, bonuses, and subsidies and other labor-related income, and to 
exclude capital and transfer income. However, the NBS only includes annual earnings in the 
data files and working hours are not reported before year 2002. This precludes the possibility 
of constructing hourly wage rates. Although hourly data might be more accurate in reflecting 
the labor market behavior, we have employed certain controls to rectify it. Another caveat in 
                                                        
6 All members of the households are included in the survey. Although Beijing is a city, it enjoys the 
same administrative status as a province.   
  8our study is that we are not able to account for labor earnings in non-earning benefits such as 
housing, health care benefits, and pension. If non-earning benefits are positively or negatively 
related to earning earnings, the omission is expected to under- or over-estimate the earning 
inequality. It is not obvious how this will affect observed trends. 
To reduce bias from variation in labor hours worked and focus on how earnings are 
determined in the labor market, we restrict our sample to workers engaged in earning 
employment by excluding individuals who are likely to be part-time workers (such as students, 
the disabled, or re-employed retired workers), employers, the self-employed, and household 
workers who are likely to work more hours than average full-time workers. We restrict the 
working to be older than 16 and younger than 60.
7 We further exclude all workers earning 
less than half of the minimum earning.
8 For prime-age adults in urban China, full-time work is 
the dominant form of employment and self-employment is relatively uncommon. Applying 
these criteria yields a sample of 118,846 workers over the 16 years, and for each year there 
are still more than 5,000 observations left.   
All earnings are adjusted by the CPI index of the six provinces (1988 as the base 
year), so that all earnings reflect real earnings. Where appropriate, we weight the sample 
based on the sampling rate for each province, i.e., sample size divided by urban labor force, 
and by the number of working-age adults in the household, to correct for bias from household 
rather than individual sampling. However, none of our results differed much depending on 
whether or not we used the weights. The education measure includes five degree 
categories,
9 ranging from illiteracy to graduate education.   
                                                        
7 Age 60 is the official retirement age for male managers. Female workers retire at 50 and male 
workers and female managers at 55.   
8  Juhn et al. (1993), Katz and Murphy (1992) and Katz and Autor (1999), among others, also apply this 
sample exclusion rule to secure a reasonably strong labor force attachment. Although China started 
implementing a minimum earning system since 1995, we have information on minimum earnings only 
since 1988. In this paper we use the minimum earning in the following four years to construct the 
minimum earning index, 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001. Because China experienced rapid growth rate of 
real incomes in our data period, we discount the average of real minimum earning in these four years 
by the earning growth rate to derive the implied minimum earning in previous years. 
9 Prior to 1993, there were six education categories (that is, college educated and above, technical 
school, senior high school, junior high school, primary school, illiteracy) reported for individuals in the 
survey. Since 1993, one of these categories (college educated and above) is subdivided into two 
categories (4-year-college and above, 3-year-college); for consistency, we combine these categories 
in a similar manner for the 1988-1992 period. We also combined primary school and illiteracy into a 
single base category (among workers, the latter group is quite small), thereby yielding a total of five 
  9The data have several limitations which should be kept in mind when interpreting the 
results. First, the NBS urban survey is restricted to households that have urban residence 
permits (hukou), and so does not include migrants working in cities.
10 The survey also 
excludes workers residing in rural areas who are engaged in earning employment. This 
sampling approach results from China’s unique administrative separation of urban and rural 
residents. NBS uses separate sampling frames and questionnaires for their urban and rural 
surveys. Nonetheless, since most earning employment is in urban areas and most earning 
workers are urban residents, the data should accurately capture main trends in earning 
inequality. Strictly speaking, however, the results apply only to China’s registered urban 
residents. 
Another limitation is that we do not have data before 1988, even though China’s 
economic reforms began in 1978. NBS did not rejuvenate its national survey apparatus until 
the mid-1980s and 1988 is the first year for which the sample and questionnaire data were 
comparable to later years. We note that nearly all of the major changes to China’s labor 
allocation system occurred after 1988, as did many other changes that likely influenced 
returns to skill (e.g., trade and FDI growth). Thus, the data should capture the main period of 
earning inequality increase. 
Tables 1 and 2 provide summary information on some sample characteristics. The 
average age (and potential experience) of the population has increased over time, from 37.2 
to 40.8, which could be due to changing demographics associated with China’s strict 
one-child family planning policy. Aging of the sample could also be a factor, although this is 
unlikely given NBS’s periodic rotation of sampled households. The gender and regional 
distribution changes relatively little over time and so are not expected to contribute 
substantially to inequality. The percentage of men increases slightly from 51.1 to 56.5 percent 
over the 16 years. There is slightly faster growth in the labor force size of richer provinces 
than poorer provinces, which would increase inequality. Finally, in terms of job types, in our 
sample we see only a small reduction in the size of the state sector, a decline in the collective 
                                                                                                                                                                            
educational categories over the entire sample. 
 
10 Because urban resident permits are under strict ration allocation in our data period, the survey 
effectively follows a relatively fixed group of people, which helps to rid the effects on inequality caused 
by changing composition of the population. 
  10sector, and an increase in the non-public sector. Since the non-public sector (which includes 
joint ventures) generally has higher earnings, this change should be inequality-increasing. 
4.  Changes in Earnings Inequality 
In this section, we examine changes in the distribution of earnings for individual 
workers.  
4.1  Measures of Overall Earnings Inequality 
The overall change in earnings distribution is illustrated in figure 1, which plots kernel 
density estimates for the years 1988, 1992, 1994, 1997, 2000 and 2003. It is clear from this 
figure that mean incomes have increased steadily, while the distribution around the means 
has widened considerably. The most noticeable change in both the mean and variance of the 
distribution occurred between 1992 and 1994. 
The first panel of table 3 reports inter-percentile differentials (90-10, 90-50, 50-10 and 
75-25) of log earnings for all workers. Earnings inequality rises steadily in the early years of 
transition, followed by a sharp increase in 1994, going from 1.48 to 1.71. A further significant 
increase occurred from 1997 to 1998, followed by a moderate increase through 2001. The 
most recent period, 2002-2003, witnessed a comparable inequality with that of the late 1990’s. 
The total increase in inequality from 1988 to 2003, as measured by the 90-10 differentials, is 
0.79 log points, a sizable increase over a 16-year period. The increase in the 75-25 percentile 
differential is also quite substantial, from 0.53 in 1988 to 0.96 in 2003. To put the magnitude of 
these differences in perspective, consider that Juhn et al. (1993) found that the difference in 
earnings growth at the top and bottom of the U.S. earning distribution to be about 45 percent 
from 1964 to 1988, or less than two percent per year. Here we find that in China this annualized 
difference was about eight percent per year, or four times greater than that in the U.S. 
Comparing the 90-50 and 50-10 differentials, we find that at the beginning of the 
period, the lower half of the income distribution had more dispersion than the top half, but this 
was reversed after 1991. The 50/10 differential rose mainly in 1994 and again after 1997, 
approaching the level of dispersion at the top half of the distribution. In China, 1994 was a 
year of relative slowdown and monetary tightening, and 1997 saw the beginning of major 
  11state-owned enterprise restructuring. Earnings inequality rose most rapidly from 1992 to 1994 
but the rising trend was sustained until the end of the studied period.   
In table 4, we present alternative measures of inequality. It is evident that the patterns 
of change in inequality revealed by the evolutions of the percentile differentials are, in general, 
quite similar to those indicated by inequality measures listed here. For instance, the Gini 
coefficient increased from 0.238 to 0.364, the coefficient of variation from 0.476 to 0.767, the 
standard deviation of log earnings from 0.445 to 0.665, and the Theil entropy index from 
0.098 to 0.227. 
Figure 2 plots the annual percent growth in real earnings for each percentile of the 
earning distribution over the studied period. All percentiles experienced earning gains during 
the period, but higher percentiles experienced larger earning gains. Thus, inequality has not 
been a story of the rich getting richer and the poor becoming poorer, but rather the rich 
getting richer faster than the poor.   
This finding indicates that the rise of earning inequality in urban China did not push 
some of the workers into the poverty trap. The situation of all workers improved during this 
process. Notably, such an assertion is only true for those who are employed.
11  Due to the 
limitations of data, we cannot investigate the influence of those unemployed - especially 
those who lost jobs involuntarily during the restructuring of China’s state sector - on the 
pattern of inequality growth and poverty reduction. But the above analysis supports the idea 
that for those already in the working population, the positive effect of average income 
increasing on poverty reduction is larger than the possible negative effect of rising inequality 
on poverty alleviation. 
4.2  Residual Earnings Inequality
12 
Another method used to describe the evolution of earnings inequality is to regress 
earnings on observed attributes such as gender, education and experience, and to examine 
                                                        
11 Urban unemployment has increasingly become a serious problem during the late 1990s, reaching 
double digits by the turn of the century in large Chinese cities, as reported by Giles et al. (2005).   
12 “Residual earning inequality” is simply the measured inequality in the residual, also called 
within-group earning inequality. It reflects earning dispersion among workers with the same education 
and experience. 
  12the dispersion of the earning residuals. The earnings residuals arguably control for 
between-group differences across many different group characteristics and indicate the 
evolution of inequality within narrowly-defined groups.   
We report percentile differentials for log earnings residuals
13 in the last (top right) 
panel of table 3. Comparing these to the ratios for log earnings themselves, we see that the 
largest growth in residual inequality also occurred between 1992 and 1994. Since the 
“observable” information has been extracted from the earnings data, the residual is resumed 
as the reflection of unobserved skills. The rising of residual inequality suggests that 
unobservable factors are increasingly important in determining earnings. Given the rapid 
changes in the labor market, this is not surprising since market mechanisms will increasingly 
reward workers by their productivity rather than just their observable credentials. This should 
not only be reflected in earning setting within firms, but also in employment choices, since 
more able, entrepreneurial workers are more likely to find employers that reward such 
characteristics.  
4.3  Earnings Inequality between Male and Female Workers 
In China, women have traditionally had employment rates nearly as high as those for 
men, and in our sample the share of females in the working population is not lower than 43 
percent even in the most recent years. Thus, it is of considerable interest to analyze these 
two groups separately, and also examine their respective impacts on the overall earnings 
distribution. 
Tables 5 and 6 provide summary statistics of some important variables in our analysis 
for both genders separately. Average earnings have risen steadily for both males and 
females and the gender earning gap keeps increasing. The most noticeable point is that there 
was a steady increase in average levels of educational attainment during the transitional 
period, partly reflecting higher education levels of new cohorts entering the workforce and the 
dropping out of low educated individuals. The share of male workers with college education 
                                                        
13 Residual inequality can be measured by the variance, the standard deviations of the residuals or 
other popular measures like the difference between the ninetieth and the tenth percentile of log 
earnings (the “90-10 gap”). Here we calculated residuals using the same specifications by which 
returns to education are estimated. 
  13or above increased from 17.8 percent in 1988 to 34.6 percent in 2003 while those with junior 
secondary and primary education fell from 39.9 and 8.8 percent to 22.8 and 2.2 percent over 
the same period. For female workers the share of those with college education or above 
increased from 7.1 percent in 1988 to 29.7 percent in 2003 while those with junior secondary 
and primary education fell from 43.7 and 13.8 percent to 20.3 and 2.4 percent over the same 
period. Female workers gained more during this period and the gender gap in educational 
attainment narrowed during these 16 years. 
The bottom panels of table 3 show percentile differentials separately for male and 
female workers. The increase in earnings inequality was slightly greater for females than 
males. For instance, from 1988 to 2003, the increase in the 90-10 differentials is 0.80 for 
females and 0.75 for males. Similarly, the increase in the 75-25 differential is 0.46 for females 
and 0.42 for males. We also found that earnings inequality is much greater in the top half of 
earnings distribution for females than males. 
Figure 3 shows that the median earning differential between males and females has 
stabilized at around 16 percent during the early 1990s, then fell from 0.17 in 1997 to 0.13 in 
2000, but then rebounded sharply to 25 percent in 2003. 
5.  Analysis Framework to Account for Rising Earning Inequality 
In this section, we conduct a regression analysis of the structure of earnings in order 
to gain more insight into the sources of changing inequality among workers during the 
transition. First, we present estimates of standard human capital earnings functions (see 
Willis, 1986) during the 1988-2003 periods. Then we introduce a multivariate framework to 
more clearly identify the contributions of education to growing inequality. The Quantile-JMP 
decomposition method uses quantile regressions to partition the observed distribution of 
earnings into ‘price’ components (earning coefficients) and ‘quantity’ components (labor force 
composition) and calculate, through simulation, the impact of each on changes in overall 
earning dispersion.   
  145.1  Human Capital Earnings Functions 
We estimate human capital earnings functions as a benchmark. The estimation 
results are shown in tables 7 and 8. The coefficients
14 on the education category dummies 
show that education premiums have increased substantially during the transition
15. For 
instance, the college degree coefficient increases from 0.252 in 1988 to 0.492 in 1996 and 
further to 0.703 in 2003 for male workers. This implies that the earnings premium for a college 
educated relative to a primary school and below educated (the omitted group) was 
approximately 29 percent in 1988, 64 percent in 1996, and 102 percent in 2003. The senior 
high school premiums relative to primary and below for males for the same three years are 16, 
31 and 37 percent, respectively. These results imply a widening of the college-high school 
premium as well. Comparing with male workers, female workers experienced a more rapid 
and significant increase in every education category. The finding of higher return to female 
education is consistent with other studies in relevant literatures. Zhang et al (2005) made a 
quite good review and discussed the possible causes. 
Since (potential) labor market experience (age-years of education-6) enters the 
regressions as a quadratic, the returns to experience need to be evaluated at specific levels 
of experience. We also computed the return to experience separately for males and females. 
To conserve space, we do not report these results in detail. The OLS estimates imply a 
decline in the returns to experience in the early years of transition, with a subsequent 
rebound.
16 Note that, in any case, these returns to experience are much smaller than those 
typically found in Western data sets. 
5.2  Quantile Regression: Theory and Regression Results 
An ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is based on the mean of the conditional 
                                                        
14 These returns to education are obtained with the traditional OLS method. Regression model 
includes educational dummy variables, potential experience, experience squared, and regional dummy 
variables as regressors. To control for selection bias, we estimate Heckman selection correction 
models, where labor force participation is identified by marital status and number of children.   
15 Zhang et al. (2005) shows the rising returns to education are robust across experience cohorts, 
gender, and within regional and ownership groups. 
16  Keane and Prarad (2006), Lehmann and Wadsworth (2000) report similar results for Poland as well 
as Russia. 
  15distribution of the regression’s dependent variable. This approach is used because one 
implicitly assumes that possible differences in terms of the impact of the exogenous variables 
along the conditional distribution are unimportant. However, this may prove inadequate in 
some research agendas. If exogenous variables influence parameters of the conditional 
distribution of the dependent variable other than the mean, then an analysis that disregards 
this possibility will be severely weakened (see Koenker and Bassett, 1978). 
Unlike OLS, quantile regression models allows for a full characterization of the 
conditional distribution of the dependent variable. Recent research on US earning structure 
(see Buchinsky, 1994, 1998) has revealed that education has a greater effect upon the 
earnings of individuals at the top of the earning distribution than upon earnings of individuals 
at the bottom of that distribution. In other words, more educated individuals experience more 
unequal earning distributions, and this seems to have been exacerbated during the 1980s.   
In an earning equation setting, the quantile regression model can be written as:    with 
(ln ) ii i Quant w x x θ θ β =  (1), where  i x  is the vector of exogenous variables and  θ β  is the 
vector of parameters.  (ln ) x Quant w θ  denotes the  th θ  conditional quantile of lnw given x. 
The  th θ  regression  quantile, 01 θ << , is defined as a solution to the problem:     
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<  (see Koenker and Bassett 1978, Buchinsky 
1994, Koenker and Hallock 2001). 
This problem does not have an explicit form but can be solved by linear programming 
methods. Standard errors are obtained by bootstrap methods. The least absolute deviation
（LAD）  estimator  of β   is a particular case within this framework. This is obtained by setting 
0.5 θ =  (the median regression). As one increases θ  from 0 to 1, one traces the entire 
distribution of y, conditional on x. 
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conditional distribution. The flexibility has been used in the returns-to-education literature and 
it has addressed the possible impact of education upon inequality, through its within-group 
inequality component. If the education-related earnings increment were the same across the 
earning distribution, then education would not impact upon within-group earning inequality as 
distributions of earning conditional on different levels of education would differ only on their 
location and not on their dispersion. By using quantile regression, we test the possibility that 
these dispersions do indeed vary across educational levels, thus resulting in an impact of 
education upon the earning distribution, through its within-group channel. 
The quantile regression results are presented in greater detail in table 9 for males and 
table 10 for females. Coefficients of the median regression indicate that the level of earnings 
depends on covariates. The coefficients generally have the expected signs and conform to 
previous studies. As expected, earnings increase with education and this is true across the 
whole distribution. The college premium jumps sharply from 1988 to 2003 at all quantile 
points. For example, median earnings were approximately 27 percent higher for college 
graduates than primary graduates in 1988, and this premium increases to 127 percent by 
2003. Overall, the quantile regressions reveal a rather interesting pattern in terms of how 
education premiums changed during the transition. 
To analyze the effects of characteristics on the dispersion of earnings, we pay 
attention to the difference between the quantile regression coefficients at the 90th percentile 
and the coefficients at the 10th percentile. If the difference between the 90th and 10th 
percentile coefficient on a covariate is positive (negative), a higher value of this variable 
increases (decreases) within-group inequality. The results show that for more than half of the 
variables the inter-percentile difference is significantly different from zero.   
We also observed the changing patterns of the effects of education on earnings 
dispersion. For example, before 1998 education had a greater impact on earnings conditional 
on their observable characteristics at the lower quantiles of earning distribution than that at 
the higher quantiles for male workers, implying that education has a negative impact upon 
within-group earning inequality. But the situation is reversed during the recent half period; 
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earnings increment associated with education is higher for those individuals whose 
unobservable characteristics place them at the top of the conditional earning distributions. 
Thus samples with more educated individuals show higher earning dispersion than samples 
of less educated people. In other words, education serves as the key factor that increases 
within-group earning inequality in the recent years (for female workers, the turning point is 
year 1997). Observed education premium patterns in recent years is qualitatively similar to 
comparable findings for the USA (Chamberlain, 1994; Buchinsky, 1994), Germany 
(Fitzenberger and Kurz, 1997), Uruguay (González and Miles, 2001) or Zambia (Nielsen and 
Rosholm, 2001) although the situation of the previous years seems different. 
5.3  Decomposition of the changes in earning inequality 
Having fit the conditional quantile function, the estimated parameters can be used to 
simulate the conditional distributions of w given x. This simulation procedure has two 
attractive properties. First, the conditional quantile model conveniently divides the observed 
earning distribution into 'price' and 'quantity' components. This is similar to a standard 
Oaxaca-Blinder procedure using OLS regression coefficients, with the key difference that the 
OLS model only characterizes the central tendency of the data (i.e., the conditional mean 
function, describing 'between-group' inequality). By contrast, the conditional quantile model 
characterizes both the central tendency of the data (in this case, the median) and the 
dispersion of the outcome variable conditional on x , i.e., the earning 'residuals.' This feature 
is critical for estimating the impact of composition on the shape of the residual earning 
distribution. Second, under the convenient (but economically unappealing) partial equilibrium 
assumption that aggregate quantities of skills in the labor market do not affect skill prices, we 
can use the conditional quantile model to simulate the impact of changing composition or 
prices on distribution of earnings. 
In particular, by applying the labor force composition data   from a given time 
period t to the price matrix 
() t gx
ˆ () t β θ  from any other time period τ , we can simulate the 
counterfactual distribution of earnings that would prevail if labor force composition were given 
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because the  ˆ ( t ) β θ   matrix describes the conditional distribution of earnings for given values 
of  x , this simulation captures the effects of composition on both between-group and residual 
inequality. 
This method can also be extended to estimate counterfactual measures of residual 
inequality. We define the coefficient vector   as our measure of between-group 
inequality, and we refer to it as 
ˆ(50) β
ˆb β ˆ(50) β ≡  ( ˆb β  serves a role akin to  ˆ
OLS β  in a 
conventional Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition). Following this logic, we define a measure of 
within-group inequality as the difference between the estimated coefficient vector  ˆ() β θ  and 
the median coefficient vector ˆb β :  ˆ w() β θ ≡ ˆ [() β θ ˆ ]
b β −  for  (0,1) θ ∈ . To summarize, the 
(correctly specified) conditional quantile model provides a complete characterization of the 
distribution of w as a function of three components: the distribution of covariates , the 
vector of between-group prices, 
( gx )
ˆb β , and the matrix of within-group (residual) prices ˆw β . 
Then  ˆ () tt f w () , gx ˆ ,
b
t β ˆ )
w
t β .  ≡ ( f t
As a compact method of summarizing the contributions of prices and quantities to 
rising earnings inequality, we implement a quantile analog of the well known Juhn, Murphy 
and Pierce (1993, “JMP”) decomposition. The observed change in inequality between any 
two periods, t and  τ  can be decomposed into three components using the following 
sequential decomposition. Let  Qθ V =    (( ) ) Qfw θτ −    equal the observed change 
in the θth earning quantile between periods   and 
(() ) t Qf w θ
t τ .  
We define: 
x Qθ V = ( Qθ (( ) , f gx τ ˆ ,
b
t β ˆ ))
w
t β − ( Qθ (( ) t , f gx ˆ ,
b
t β ˆ w
t β )) as the 
contribution of changing quantities (labor force composition) to Qθ Δ . We define   
b Qθ = V( Qθ (( ) , f gx τ ˆ ,
b
τ β ˆ w
t β )) − ( Qθ (( ) , f gx τ ˆ ,
b
t β ˆ w
t β
Q
))  as the marginal contribution of 
changing between-group prices to θ Δ . Finally, we define 
  19w Qθ = V( Qθ (( ) , f gx τ ˆ ,
b
τ β ˆ ))
w
τ β − ( Qθ (( ) , f gx τ ˆ ,
b
τ β ˆ ))
w
t β  as the marginal contribution of 
changing within-group prices to Qθ Δ .  
Notice that this decomposition adds up to the total observed change 
w Qθ V
b Qθ +V
x Qθ +V Qθ =V . This is an important advantage over the JMP procedure, in which 
the “residual price and quantity component” must be estimated as a remainder term after the 
other two components are calculated. 
The results from our decomposition are given in tables 11 and 12 for male and female 
workers separately. The first panel of these two tables gives the estimated log earning 
differentials at the various percentiles and the overall effects of each group of factors. The 
second panel shows the detailed decomposition results. Here we divide the entire period into 
two sub-periods 1988 through 1997 and 1997 through 2003. 
It is interesting to compare these results with those in table 12. As shown in the first panel of 
these two tables, the rise of female earning dispersion between 1988 and 2003 is 22.1 log 
points larger than male earning inequality. This gap mainly comes from the dramatic 
expansion of the lower half of female earning distribution from 1988 through 1997. The most 
striking difference between the first panel of the two tables is that the overall effect of 
education on female earning inequality is quite large compared to male earning distribution, 
especially in the first period. 
Of 59.1 log points rise in male 90/10 inequality over this period, the decomposition 
attributes a relatively small offsetting roll (-36.8 log points) to quantities, versus 34.0 points to 
between-group prices and 61.9 points to within-group prices. When we reverse the order of 
the decomposition, we find that the estimated contribution of labor force composition to 
inequality is within rounding -3.3 points, versus 16.0 points to between-group prices and 46.4 
points to within-group prices. For female workers, the trend is similar. This denotes that 
changes in prices are the determinant forces of rising earning inequality.   
When we examine the dominant force by periods, more differences are revealed 
between the genders. When comparing the dominant forces at different parts of male 
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within-group price changes are both significant inequality-increasing forces which increased 
the upper-tail earning distribution by 47.9 log points on net; at the same time, within-group 
price and composition changes played an economically significant role in explaining 
inequality changes at the lower tail of earning distribution.   
Holding prices constant, the change in composition alone would have been expected 
to decrease low-tail inequality by -25.4 log points. Offsetting this force, between group and 
within-group price changes increased lower-tail inequality by 8.2 and 23.8 log points 
respectively. On net, the 6.6 log points of observed lower-tail expansion reflects the 
countervailing impacts of ‘increasing’ prices and a decrease in the prevalence of 
characteristics associated with higher earning dispersion. When we perform this 
decomposition for the growth of inequality between 1997 and 2003, an important contrast 
with the earlier period emerges. Composition played quite a big inequality-decreasing role in 
explaining changes in upper-tail compression after 1997 while in within-group price changes 
it is the dominant force in explaining variations in lower-tail earning inequality. 
Table 12 also shows a comparatively active role played by these three forces in the 
changes of female earning inequality. But the effect of prices is larger for males and also 
more pronounced in the lower tail of the earning distribution. Similar patterns prevail when 
upper and lower tail inequality is decomposed separately.   
When examining the role that education plays in earning inequality by gender, we 
found that the contribution of education expansion (the most important changes in the labor 
force composition) to rising earning inequality is negligible for both males and females. As for 
the details of the effects of education, the decomposition gives very different stories for males 
and females. 
The overall effect of education was a comparatively small inequality-decreasing force 
which reduced male earning inequality by -7.3 log points in the first period while it largely 
increased earning inequality by 27.9 log points in the second period. Of the 59.1 log points 
rise in male 90/10 inequality over 1988-2003, the decomposition attributes 20.6 log points to 
the overall effect of education. In contrast, education exerts much larger effects with the 
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81.2 log points rise) in female 90/10 inequality over 1988-2003.   
The effect of education for males is much greater in recent years. In the first period 
(1988-1997), education reduced earning inequality among high-wage male workers whereas 
in the second period it increased earning inequality at both the upper and lower parts of 
earning distribution. For females, things are different. In the first period, the overall effects of 
education contributed to the rise of earning inequality. The most prominent forces are price 
effects, especially within-group price. In the second period, education had a negative effect 
on the rising of upper part earning inequality which could be attributed to the large and 
negative within-group price; at the same interval education plays a positive role in the 
inequality-rising of the lower part of earning distribution, which is also driven by the 
within-group price.   
6.  Conclusions and Policy Relevance 
This paper sets out to evaluate the effects of education on earning inequality in urban 
China during the country’s transition period. We explicitly identified the changing pattern of 
earning inequality. Overall earning inequality has unambiguously risen in urban China during 
1988-2003. Most of the inequality increase occurred at the top half of the earning distribution, 
with earning growth of the rich and highly educated growing particularly rapidly. The period of 
most rapid inequality increase was 1992 to 1994 when China substantially liberalized 
economic activity and experienced high growth. The more recent period, 1997 to 2000, has 
also seen substantial increases in inequality. The most recent period, 2000 to 2003, has seen 
the slowing down of the increases in inequality.   
During the transitional period, all percentiles experienced earning gains, but higher 
percentiles experienced larger earning gains. This finding indicates that the rise of earning 
inequality in urban China failed to push some workers into the poverty trap since the situation 
of all workers improved during this process. The positive effect of average income increasing 
overwhelmed the negative effect of rising inequality on poverty. 
Our estimates of standard human capital earnings functions indicate that education 
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declined in the early years of transition, consistent with rapid obsolescence of industry- and 
firm-specific skills. There are systematic differences in the returns to education and 
experience by gender along the conditional earning distribution. Moreover, the patterns are 
remarkably stable from year to year. Returns to education are higher for the low earning 
individuals in the first half of this period conditional on their observable characteristics. This 
suggests that education has a negative impact upon within-group earning inequality. 
However, the situation is reversed during the recent half period; that is, education serves as 
the key factor that increases within-group earning inequality. 
We also conducted a detailed examination of the sources of the increase in earnings 
inequality using the newly available Quantile-JMP decomposition method. We find that a 
substantial fraction of the increase in overall earnings inequality is attributable to changes in 
within-group inequality. A striking result is that increases in within-group inequality are 
concentrated among workers with higher levels of formal education. We also find that the 
majority of the increase in earnings inequality (20.6 versus 59.1 log points) is attributed to the 
overall effect of education. From 1988 to 1997 education served as the equalizing force to 
decrease earning inequality while it was the primary driving force when earning inequality 
rose rapidly from 1997 through 2003. The empirical analysis also reveals that the overall 
effect of college and above education category on the growth of earning inequality is the most 
pronounced one.   
Our analysis tested whether the education expansion of China’s urban labor force 
may have led to a mechanical (i.e., not due to price changes) rise in earning dispersion in the 
sample period. We failed to confirm this hypothesis. Shifts in labor force composition have 
affected earning inequality through 1988 to 2003. But these compositional shifts of education 
have primarily operated on the lower tail of the earning distribution and, moreover, have 
primarily served to mute a contemporaneous, countervailing lower-tail price expansion. The 
rise of male earning dispersion between 1988 and 2003 is almost entirely accounted for by 
changes in prices rather than compositional shifts. 
The above findings are consistent with our intuition when we reviewed the evolution of 
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highly compacted, with wages of college-educated white-collar workers little different from 
those of manual workers. China’s economic reform is characterized as progressive in the first 
period we studied. Since then the wage setting system came to pay workers according to 
their productive characteristics. During the second period, a radical reform era, the 
government moved forward with aggressive restructuring and privatization of state-owned 
enterprises. Thus the transition can be interpreted as a period of technical change, not in the 
sense that the technical frontier had shifted out, but rather in the sense that state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) had reorganized themselves to achieve greater technical efficiency, and 
modified production processes to reflect market prices of inputs ( in particular, by eliminating 
labor hoarding). 
A rapid pace of change may also help explain rising within-group inequality. Given the 
friction in the matching of workers with new technology, an acceleration of the rate of 
technical progress leads to increased wage dispersion among identical workers. Growth in 
within-group inequality can then be explained by this friction.   
The above analysis shed light on the potential direction of policies that aim to slow 
down or reverse the rapidly rising earning inequality. Firstly, based on our empirical results, 
we do not think that education expansion is an effective policy option to decrease inequality in 
or areas like urban China although it remains an important solution to reduce absolute 
poverty. Secondly, considering that the increases in within-group inequality are concentrated 
among workers with higher levels of formal education, we propose to improve the quality of 
education to help the workers better match their skills with new technology. Thirdly, different 
impacts of education expansion detected for males and females again raised the importance 
of gender issues in the labor market. For female workers, especially those who are low 
educated, one more year of education will bring quite a significant earning increment 
conditional on other observable characteristics. 
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Table 1. Sample size and basic statistics for all workers 
Age PEXP  Male  SOE  COE  NON-PUBLIC 
Year 
Total 
Observations  (year)  (year)  (%)   (%)   (%)   (%) 
1988  6,093 37.2 20.8 51.1 74.6  24.7  0.7 
1989  5,624 37.4 20.9 51.8 75.4  23.6  1.0 
1990  6,199 38.0 21.3 51.7 76.1  22.8  1.1 
1991  6,225 37.8 21.1 52.1 77.2  21.7  1.1 
1992  7,856 38.0 21.0 52.0 76.6  20.6  2.8 
1993  7,017 38.3 21.3 52.2 76.2  20.4  3.4 
1994  6,752 38.3 21.1 52.6 76.8  17.8  5.4 
1995  6,831 38.6 21.3 52.6 78.4  15.5  6.1 
1996  6,652 39.1 21.8 52.9 78.5  15.2  6.3 
1997  6,644 39.4 22.0 52.9 77.7  14.9  7.4 
1998  6,332 39.5 21.9 53.5 77.2  14.3  8.5 
1999  6,094 39.6 21.9 53.5 74.6  13.9  11.4 
2000  6,203 39.9 22.1 54.7 72.6  11.3  16.1 
2001  5,412 40.4 22.6 55.0 70.1  10.8  19.1 
2002  13,852 40.9 23.0 56.3 69.3  8.0  22.7 
2003  15,060 40.8 22.8 56.5 66.0  7.0  27.0 
Source: NBS, Urban household survey, 1988-2003. 
Table 2. Sample size and regional distribution for all workers 
Beijing   Liaoning  Zhejiang  Guangdong  Shaanxi   Sichuan  
Year 
Total 
Observations  (%)  (%)  (%) (%) (%)  (%) 
1988  6,093 9.6 25.7 10.7 21.6 8.3 24.0 
1989  5,624 8.5 25.2 10.7 22.7 8.6 24.3 
1990  6,199 8.9 26.1 10.4 22.7 8.7 23.2 
1991  6,225 9.1 24.6 10.7 23.4 8.6 23.6 
1992  7,856 9.4 24.6 10.4 23.0 8.7 23.9 
1993  7,017 9.4 24.4 10.3 24.1 8.4 23.4 
1994  6,752 9.1 24.0 10.1 25.3 8.3 23.2 
1995  6,831 8.9 23.3 10.2 25.4 8.5 23.7 
1996  6,652 8.8 22.2 10.2 26.3 8.4 24.1 
1997  6,644 8.3 22.0 10.3 26.8 8.3 24.3 
1998  6,332 8.3 21.1 10.9 27.3 8.3 24.1 
1999  6,094 8.3 20.0 11.0 28.7 8.1 23.9 
2000  6,203 9.6 21.9 11.9 30.3 8.6 17.7 
2001  5,412 9.9 22.2 12.0 30.1 9.3 16.6 
2002  13,852 9.2 18.3 11.2 31.8 7.5 22.0 
2003  15,060 7.4 17.1 11.0 37.4 6.5 20.6 
Source: NBS, Urban household survey, 1988-2003. Table 3. Percentile differentials, 1988-2003 
All Workers  All workers (Earning Residuals *) 
year 
90-10 90-50 50-10 75-25 90-10 90-50 50-10 75-25 
1988 1.08 0.51 0.57 0.53 2.11 1.64 0.47 0.74
1989 1.17 0.54 0.63 0.56 2.06 1.48 0.58 0.75
1990 1.16 0.54 0.61 0.56 2.25 1.71 0.54 0.82
1991 1.25 0.66 0.59 0.59 2.20 1.67 0.53 0.83
1992 1.31 0.71 0.59 0.61 2.21 1.65 0.56 0.89
1993 1.48 0.82 0.66 0.70 2.34 1.67 0.66 1.00
1994 1.71 0.88 0.82 0.86 2.56 1.78 0.77 1.07
1995 1.65 0.90 0.76 0.82 2.56 1.79 0.77 1.10
1996 1.73 0.92 0.81 0.87 2.77 1.94 0.83 1.22
1997 1.70 0.92 0.78 0.85 2.77 1.84 0.93 1.29
1998 1.80 0.94 0.85 0.88 2.89 1.88 1.00 1.45
1999 1.85 0.95 0.90 0.94 3.13 2.13 1.01 1.46
2000 1.84 0.94 0.91 0.91 3.37 2.14 1.23 1.70
2001 1.93 0.96 0.96 0.97 3.67 2.24 1.43 1.99
2002 1.79 0.91 0.88 0.91 3.86 2.26 1.60 2.11
2003 1.87 1.00 0.87 0.96 3.99 2.39 1.60 2.13
    
Male Workers  Female Workers 
year 
90-10 90-50 50-10 75-25 90-10 90-50 50-10 75-25 
1988  1.06 0.52 0.54 0.50 1.08 0.50 0.58 0.52
1989  1.12 0.56 0.56 0.52 1.15 0.52 0.64 0.58
1990  1.12 0.54 0.58 0.53 1.14 0.52 0.62 0.57
1991  1.21 0.65 0.56 0.55 1.26 0.65 0.61 0.61
1992  1.30 0.75 0.56 0.59 1.28 0.68 0.60 0.62
1993  1.44 0.81 0.63 0.68 1.47 0.79 0.68 0.71
1994  1.66 0.90 0.76 0.82 1.77 0.90 0.87 0.89
1995  1.61 0.89 0.72 0.80 1.65 0.87 0.79 0.82
1996  1.66 0.90 0.76 0.85 1.78 0.93 0.85 0.86
1997  1.64 0.89 0.75 0.82 1.76 0.93 0.82 0.88
1998  1.70 0.92 0.78 0.84 1.88 0.97 0.91 0.91
1999  1.75 0.95 0.80 0.92 1.89 0.96 0.93 0.97
2000  1.74 0.92 0.81 0.88 1.91 0.95 0.95 0.97
2001  1.75 0.92 0.84 0.90 2.05 1.05 1.00 1.05
2002  1.72 0.87 0.85 0.86 1.80 0.94 0.86 0.94
2003  1.81 0.96 0.85 0.92 1.88 1.01 0.87 0.98
Source: NBS, Urban household survey, 1988-2003. 
* Residuals are calculated ^^^^^^^^^^ 
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Year  1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
relative mean deviation  0.164 0.182 0.170 0.179 0.186 0.215 0.236 0.228 
coefficient of variation  0.476 0.536 0.515 0.537 0.655 0.661 0.693 0.670 
standard deviation of logs  0.445 0.494 0.456 0.466 0.472 0.539 0.601 0.580 
Gini coefficient  0.238 0.262 0.247 0.258 0.268 0.305 0.332 0.321 
Mehran measure  0.331 0.360 0.340 0.352 0.359 0.406 0.446 0.431 
Piesch measure  0.191 0.213 0.200 0.211 0.223 0.254 0.276 0.266 
Kakwani measure  0.053 0.064 0.057 0.062 0.068 0.085 0.098 0.092 
Theil entropy measure  0.098 0.121 0.108 0.117 0.137 0.166 0.190 0.178 
Theil mean log deviation measure  0.098 0.120 0.105 0.112 0.121 0.154 0.184 0.172 
          
Year  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
relative mean deviation  0.240 0.239 0.246 0.248 0.250 0.252 0.247 0.261 
coefficient of variation  0.711 0.723 0.755 0.726 0.762 0.750 0.722 0.767 
standard deviation of logs  0.608 0.608 0.623 0.630 0.642 0.650 0.634 0.665 
Gini coefficient  0.337 0.337 0.346 0.347 0.352 0.354 0.347 0.364 
Mehran measure  0.450 0.449 0.460 0.464 0.470 0.474 0.466 0.486 
Piesch measure  0.280 0.281 0.288 0.288 0.293 0.294 0.287 0.303 
Kakwani measure  0.101 0.101 0.106 0.106 0.110 0.110 0.106 0.116 
Theil entropy measure  0.196 0.199 0.211 0.206 0.218 0.216 0.205 0.227 
Theil mean log deviation measure  0.190 0.191 0.201 0.202 0.211 0.213 0.203 0.224 
Source: NBS, Urban household survey, 1988-2003. 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics for male workers 
















1988  3,111 2081.9  38.7 17.8 11.7 21.7 39.9  8.8
1989  2,897 2011.8  38.9 18.7 11.5 24.1 37.3  8.2
1990  3,208 2190.2  39.5 18.9 11.8 23.9 37.7  7.6
1991  3,222 2340.0  39.4 20.6 11.8 23.0 36.5  7.9
1992  4,091 2879.3  39.4 22.7 12.8 24.5 33.4  6.5
1993  3,673 3170.7  39.7 23.3 12.1 24.5 34.5  5.5
1994  3,558 3634.5  39.7 25.7 12.6 24.9 31.6  4.9
1995  3,598 3754.9  40.0 26.5 12.1 26.9 29.6  4.9
1996  3,535 3891.5  40.5 27.2 12.2 26.1 29.8  4.6
1997  3,533 4077.0  40.8 27.1 11.7 26.6 30.0  4.4
1998  3,409 4396.8  40.8 28.5 12.3 27.4 27.7  4.1
1999  3,286 4947.7  40.9 30.4 12.9 27.5 25.8  3.4
2000  3,404 5363.8  41.2 32.6 10.5 28.1 24.9  3.9
2001  3,003 5770.9  41.9 31.1 10.2 28.5 26.7  3.5
2002  7,876 5938.8  42.4 33.7 11.7 27.1 24.9  2.5
2003  8,593 6848.6  42.4 34.6 11.6 28.7 22.8  2.2
Source: NBS, Urban household survey, 1988-2003. 
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Year 
Sample 















1988  2,982 1737.2  35.7 7.1 12.0 23.5 43.7  13.8
1989  2,727 1692.1  35.8 7.4 13.1 24.6 42.8  12.2
1990  2,991 1834.6  36.3 9.0 14.1 24.6 41.2  11.2
1991  3,003 1988.9  36.2 10.1 13.2 26.3 38.4  12.0
1992  3,765 2412.1  36.5 13.3 13.9 28.0 36.2  8.7
1993  3,344 2654.3  36.8 12.8 14.4 29.0 36.1  7.7
1994  3,194 3030.8  36.8 14.5 15.8 29.6 34.3  5.8
1995  3,233 3149.9  37.0 16.0 15.0 30.3 32.6  6.1
1996  3,117 3295.6  37.6 16.4 15.5 30.4 32.7  5.0
1997  3,111 3441.7  37.7 17.5 15.0 30.8 32.4  4.2
1998  2,923 3824.0  37.9 20.1 16.9 30.1 29.0  3.9
1999  2,808 4382.3  38.1 22.2 17.0 30.4 26.9  3.6
2000  2,799 4681.4  38.3 24.6 16.5 32.8 23.2  2.9
2001  2,409 5131.8  38.6 24.4 16.8 33.4 23.2  2.3
2002  5,976 4947.5  39.1 27.4 16.0 31.9 22.1  2.6
2003  6,467 5532.9  38.8 29.7 15.7 32.0 20.3  2.4
Source: NBS, Urban household survey, 1988-2003. 
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0.252 0.151 0.148 0.069 0.048  -0.001
1988 
[0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025]
0.339 0.231 0.202 0.141 0.039 0.000
1989 
[0.044] [0.043] [0.041] [0.032] [0.009] [0.000]
0.279 0.206 0.136 0.042 0.046  -0.001
1990 
[0.029] [0.031] [0.031] [0.028] [0.003] [0.000]
0.238 0.172 0.105 0.033 0.042  -0.001
1991 
[0.031] [0.033] [0.032] [0.030] [0.003] [0.000]
0.273 0.182 0.104 0.020 0.035 0.000
1992 
[0.032] [0.033] [0.033] [0.032] [0.002] [0.000]
0.336 0.204 0.167 0.058 0.037 0.000
1993 
[0.041] [0.042] [0.042] [0.040] [0.003] [0.000]
0.482 0.332 0.227 0.102 0.030 0.000
1994 
[0.048] [0.049] [0.049] [0.047] [0.003] [0.000]
0.466 0.320 0.252 0.130 0.032 0.000
1995 
[0.045] [0.047] [0.046] [0.045] [0.004] [0.000]
0.492 0.278 0.267 0.141 0.035 0.000
1996 
[0.050] [0.052] [0.051] [0.049] [0.004] [0.000]
0.333 0.197 0.181 0.034 0.034 0.000
1997 
[0.050] [0.052] [0.051] [0.049] [0.005] [0.000]
0.430 0.224 0.143 0.032 0.022 0.000
1998 
[0.051] [0.051] [0.051] [0.049] [0.005] [0.000]
0.534 0.326 0.202 0.055 0.036  -0.001
1999 
[0.061] [0.061] [0.060] [0.059] [0.005] [0.000]
0.581 0.380 0.232 0.083 0.032 0.000
2000 
[0.055] [0.060] [0.058] [0.054] [0.007] [0.000]
0.550 0.351 0.266 0.124 0.029 0.000
2001 
[0.064] [0.066] [0.063] [0.061] [0.007] [0.000]
0.604 0.354 0.268 0.102 0.033 0.000
2002 
[0.062] [0.058] [0.053] [0.050] [0.006] [0.000]
0.703 0.438 0.313 0.167 0.029 0.000
2003 
[0.080] [0.072] [0.065] [0.058] [0.007] [0.000]
Source: NBS urban household survey, 1988-2003.   
Regression model also includes regional dummy variables. We utilize Heckman selection 
model to correct the sample selection bias. a: Defined as age minus years of school minus 6. 
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Table 8. OLS Regression coefficients for female workers, 1988 to 2003   





















0.493 0.351 0.293 0.157 0.046  -0.001 1988 
[0.029] [0.025] [0.026] [0.024] [0.003] [0.000]
0.500 0.406 0.322 0.161 0.048  -0.001 1989 
[0.038] [0.031] [0.032] [0.027] [0.006] [0.000]
0.537 0.431 0.303 0.164 0.056  -0.001 1990 
[0.034] [0.028] [0.029] [0.026] [0.003] [0.000]
0.513 0.379 0.287 0.174 0.041  -0.001 1991 
[0.035] [0.030] [0.031] [0.028] [0.004] [0.000]
0.522 0.367 0.261 0.154 0.041  -0.001 1992 
[0.031] [0.030] [0.031] [0.029] [0.003] [0.000]
0.554 0.385 0.287 0.169 0.037  -0.001 1993 
[0.041] [0.039] [0.040] [0.037] [0.004] [0.000]
0.784 0.617 0.448 0.286 0.027 0.000 1994 
[0.052] [0.051] [0.050] [0.048] [0.005] [0.000]
0.695 0.572 0.416 0.241 0.028 0.000 1995 
[0.049] [0.048] [0.048] [0.045] [0.005] [0.000]
0.617 0.506 0.318 0.139 0.040  -0.001 1996 
[0.055] [0.053] [0.052] [0.050] [0.006] [0.000]
0.682 0.560 0.376 0.185 0.025 0.000 1997 
[0.080] [0.081] [0.056] [0.048] [0.020] [0.001]
0.766 0.622 0.427 0.218 0.032 0.000 1998 
[0.064] [0.063] [0.056] [0.050] [0.008] [0.000]
0.975 0.720 0.503 0.227 0.040  -0.001 1999 
[0.069] [0.066] [0.064] [0.060] [0.007] [0.000]
0.917 0.654 0.529 0.298 0.003 0.000 2000 
[0.074] [0.071] [0.070] [0.067] [0.006] [0.000]
0.834 0.629 0.453 0.190 0.008 0.000 2001 
[0.105] [0.101] [0.097] [0.095] [0.009] [0.000]
1.088 0.783 0.513 0.181 0.060  -0.001 2002 
[0.070] [0.066] [0.059] [0.055] [0.007] [0.000]
1.206 0.878 0.568 0.265 0.061  -0.001 2003 
[0.083] [0.080] [0.073] [0.069] [0.007] [0.000]
Source: NBS urban household survey, 1988-2003 (Standard errors are in bracket.) 
Regression model also includes regional dummy variables. We utilize Heckman selection 
model to correct the sample selection bias. a: Defined as age minus years of school minus 6. 
 Table 9. Quantile regression coefficients for male workers, selected variables, 1988 to 2003. Dependent variable: log (annual earning) 
college and above  Technical School  Senior High School  Junior High School  Potential Experience Potential Experience Square 
year 
q=10 q=50 q=90 q=10 q=50 q=90 q=10 q=50 q=90 q=10 q=50 q=90 q=10 q=50 q=90 q=10 q=50 q=90 
1988 0.368 0.238 0.230 0.236 0.149 0.073 0.220 0.137 0.096 0.075 0.061 0.071 0.070 0.043 0.035 -0.001 -0.001  0.000 
 [0.038] [0.033] [0.050] [0.044] [0.031] [0.055] [0.042] [0.034] [0.047] [0.041] [0.030] [0.041] [0.004] [0.003]  0.005  0.000  0.000 0.000 
1989 0.467 0.317 0.282 0.319 0.211 0.179 0.279 0.222 0.167 0.177 0.115 0.134 0.064 0.043 0.037 -0.001 -0.001  0.000 
 [0.058] [0.030] [0.048] [0.068] [0.033] [0.045] [0.062] [0.030] [0.050] [0.057] [0.028] [0.067] [0.005] [0.003] [0.006] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
1990 0.405 0.245 0.186 0.301 0.167 0.122 0.196 0.110 0.132 0.095 0.035 0.010 0.061 0.044 0.040 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 [0.046] [0.032] [0.044] [0.046] [0.032] [0.050] [0.044] [0.035] [0.044] [0.042] [0.034] [0.037] [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
1991 0.384 0.253 0.156 0.263 0.182 0.144 0.225 0.113 0.050 0.094 0.034 0.018 0.060 0.043 0.034 -0.001 -0.001  0.000 
 [0.051] [0.042] [0.052] [0.062] [0.048] [0.053] [0.047] [0.043] [0.052] [0.048] [0.041] [0.052] [0.005] [0.003] [0.004] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
1992 0.375 0.290 0.186 0.274 0.197 0.087 0.169 0.153 0.045 0.057 0.060 0.003 0.046 0.033 0.024 -0.001  0.000  0.000 
 [0.050] [0.032] [0.046] [0.050] [0.033] [0.047] [0.049] [0.034] [0.047] [0.047] [0.030] [0.048] [0.004] [0.002] [0.004] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
1993 0.385 0.321 0.290 0.298 0.192 0.128 0.219 0.172 0.171 0.068 0.073 0.069 0.051 0.034 0.026 -0.001  0.000  0.000 
 [0.067] [0.045] [0.070] [0.066] [0.043] [0.074] [0.070] [0.042] [0.072] [0.069] [0.041] [0.070] [0.005] [0.003] [0.004] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
1994 0.616 0.470 0.438 0.476 0.312 0.256 0.309 0.244 0.242 0.142 0.133 0.150 0.051 0.030 0.016 -0.001  0.000  0.000 
 [0.073] [0.074] [0.080] [0.077] [0.071] [0.080] [0.077] [0.076] [0.083] [0.074] [0.071] [0.075] [0.005] [0.003] [0.006] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
1995 0.600 0.400 0.392 0.474 0.236 0.265 0.341 0.218 0.207 0.196 0.093 0.153 0.058 0.024 0.017 -0.001  0.000  0.000 
 [0.072] [0.057] [0.065] [0.076] [0.062] [0.074] [0.081] [0.063] [0.064] [0.067] [0.059] [0.061] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
1996 0.556 0.389 0.413 0.367 0.209 0.251 0.337 0.183 0.225 0.181 0.073 0.120 0.055 0.028 0.026 -0.001  0.000  0.000 
 [0.089] [0.054] [0.051] [0.104] [0.053] [0.605] [0.087] [0.053] [0.053] [0.082] [0.049] [0.044] [0.007] [0.004] [0.004] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
1997 0.467 0.329 0.212 0.349 0.247 0.095 0.250 0.197 0.051 0.064 0.060  -0.008 0.051 0.032 0.032 -0.001  0.000  0.000 
 [0.081] [0.058] [0.078] [0.086] [0.060] [0.075] [0.085] [0.058] [0.078] [0.079] [0.059] [0.068] [0.006] [0.003] [0.004] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
1998 0.405 0.442 0.497 0.222 0.261 0.320 0.138 0.167 0.277  -0.057 0.068 0.144 0.045 0.029 0.013 -0.001  0.000  0.000 
 [0.065] [0.051] [0.080] [0.080] [0.052] [0.082] [0.071] [0.050] [0.076] [0.054] [0.054] [0.073] [0.007] [0.004] [0.006] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
1999 0.575 0.591 0.645 0.365 0.401 0.400 0.248 0.283 0.350 0.043 0.127 0.231 0.050 0.030 0.028 -0.001  0.000  0.000 
 [0.103] [0.054] [0.108] [0.107] [0.058] [0.111] [0.109] [0.054] [0.113] [0.108] [0.058] [0.110] [0.007] [0.004] [0.006] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
2000 0.651 0.619 0.738 0.384 0.466 0.491 0.251 0.328 0.380 0.067 0.161 0.206 0.057 0.028 0.016 -0.001  0.000  0.000 
 [0.095] [0.058] [0.078] [0.107] [0.062] [0.086] [0.096] [0.062] [0.077] [0.094] [0.060] [0.069] [0.006] [0.004] [0.007] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
2001 0.564 0.636 0.674 0.308 0.427 0.434 0.246 0.346 0.304 0.103 0.189 0.152 0.069 0.035 0.039 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 [0.106] [0.085] [0.104] [0.105] [0.946] [0.106] [0.108] [0.083] [0.109] [0.091] [0.081] [0.095] [0.007] [0.006] [0.008] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
2002 0.791 0.754 0.670 0.403 0.494 0.438 0.337 0.384 0.338 0.155 0.166 0.173 0.051 0.043 0.039 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 [0.077] [0.045] [0.053] [0.073] [0.049] [0.051] [0.073] [0.048] [0.053] [0.068] [0.046] [0.054] [0.006] [0.003] [0.004] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
2003 0.809 0.821 0.728 0.502 0.539 0.497 0.353 0.416 0.374 0.173 0.222 0.226 0.044 0.041 0.028 -0.001 -0.001  0.000 
 [0.063] [0.054] [0.063] [0.067] [0.059] [0.065] [0.061] [0.053] [0.058] [0.062] [0.050] [0.057] [0.005] [0.003] [0.005] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Source: NBS urban household survey, 1988-2003 - (Standard errors are in brackets) 
  36 Table 10. Quantile regression coefficients for female workers, selected variables, 1988 to 2003 (Standard errors are in brackets). Dependent variable: 
log (annual earning) 
college and above  Technical School  Senior High School  Junior High School  Potential Experience Potential Experience Squared 
year 
q=10 q=50 q=90 q=10  q=50  q=90 q=10 q=50 q=90 q=10 q=50 q=90 q=10 q=50 q=90  q=10  q=50  q=90 
1988 0.646 0.494 0.361  0.535  0.342 0.232 0.368 0.286 0.222 0.188 0.146 0.119 0.060 0.048 0.040 -0.001 -0.001  -0.001 
  [0.055]  [0.028] [0.051]  [0.052]  [0.024] [0.054] [0.056] [0.029] [0.049] [0.055]  [0.025] [0.045] [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] 
1989 0.619 0.560 0.336  0.524  0.401 0.265 0.396 0.333 0.203 0.181 0.168 0.087 0.071 0.050 0.034 -0.001 -0.001  -0.001 
  [0.064]  [0.031] [0.056]  [0.076]  [0.029] [0.057] [0.074] [0.031] [0.059] [0.064]  [0.026] [0.052] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] 
1990 0.625 0.526 0.383  0.531  0.385 0.295 0.340 0.287 0.223 0.153 0.152 0.138 0.075 0.051 0.039 -0.001 -0.001  -0.001 
  [0.052]  [0.033] [0.052]  [0.047]  [0.031] [0.036] [0.044] [0.036] [0.038] [0.038]  [0.028] [0.033] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] 
1991 0.779 0.489 0.409  0.598  0.387 0.309 0.397 0.258 0.217 0.241 0.160 0.171 0.066 0.045 0.025 -0.001 -0.001  0.000 
  [0.056]  [0.036] [0.040]  [0.054]  [0.035] [0.040] [0.058] [0.033] [0.041] [0.055]  [0.035] [0.032] [0.006] [0.003] [0.006] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] 
1992 0.698 0.490 0.435  0.544  0.358 0.291 0.342 0.280 0.266 0.248 0.143 0.161 0.064 0.044 0.028 -0.001 -0.001  0.000 
  [0.075]  [0.041] [0.050]  [0.078]  [0.040] [0.052] [0.073] [0.042] [0.051] [0.070]  [0.040] [0.050] [0.004] [0.003] [0.005] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] 
1993 0.736 0.520 0.457  0.567  0.383 0.338 0.398 0.288 0.294 0.242 0.181 0.184 0.062 0.041 0.021 -0.001 -0.001  0.000 
  [0.075]  [0.046] [0.065]  [0.076]  [0.040] [0.066] [0.078] [0.039] [0.064] [0.078]  [0.041] [0.060] [0.006] [0.004] [0.005] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] 
1994 1.034 0.843 0.596  0.836  0.638 0.434 0.530 0.484 0.379 0.414 0.344 0.204 0.049 0.037 0.015 -0.001 -0.001  0.000 
  [0.059]  [0.056] [0.079]  [0.049]  [0.058] [0.076] [0.067] [0.060] [0.083] [0.056]  [0.059] [0.084] [0.006] [0.005] [0.007] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] 
1995 1.000 0.651 0.500  0.797  0.532 0.454 0.563 0.384 0.346 0.381 0.208 0.178 0.061 0.032 0.009 -0.001 0.000  0.000 
  [0.086]  [0.048] [0.088]  [0.083]  [0.048] [0.088] [0.082] [0.049] [0.085] [0.082]  [0.048] [0.081] [0.007] [0.004] [0.007] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] 
1996 0.636 0.666 0.511  0.586  0.550 0.451 0.263 0.374 0.348 0.119 0.203 0.143 0.056 0.033 0.030 -0.001 -0.001  -0.001 
  [0.106]  [0.064] [0.076]  [0.090]  [0.060] [0.074] [0.100] [0.062] [0.074] [0.094]  [0.061] [0.066] [0.008] [0.005] [0.008] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] 
1997 0.658 0.688 0.782  0.564  0.599 0.658 0.293 0.372 0.582 0.049 0.190 0.377 0.050 0.032 0.029 -0.001 0.000  0.000 
  [0.110]  [0.054] [0.068]  [0.101]  [0.056] [0.060] [0.104] [0.052] [0.068] [0.099]  [0.054] [0.058] [0.007] [0.005] [0.006] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] 
1998 0.772 0.821 0.893  0.649  0.705 0.743 0.333 0.467 0.575 0.128 0.266 0.368 0.049 0.034 0.034 -0.001 0.000  -0.001 
  [0.158]  [0.068] [0.086]  [0.158]  [0.060] [0.082] [0.150] [0.071] [0.089] [0.144]  [0.059] [0.070] [0.008] [0.005] [0.010] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] 
1999 0.944 0.982 0.945  0.691  0.769 0.704 0.394 0.536 0.548 0.144 0.233 0.283 0.061 0.032 0.035 -0.001 0.000  0.000 
  [0.090]  [0.088] [0.107]  [0.099]  [0.083] [0.103] [0.095] [0.083] [0.095] [0.087]  [0.082] [0.097] [0.008] [0.006] [0.007] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] 
2000 0.898 1.072 0.992  0.593  0.813 0.740 0.414 0.608 0.606 0.220 0.307 0.361 0.018 0.025 0.028 0.000 0.000  0.000 
  [0.115]  [0.084] [0.126]  [0.104]  [0.080] [0.127] [0.100] [0.086] [0.120] [0.095]  [0.077] [0.116] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] 
2001 0.673 0.985 0.797  0.464  0.751 0.601 0.223 0.546 0.381 0.096 0.207 0.045 0.015 0.021 0.007 0.000 0.000  0.000 
  [0.118]  [0.092] [0.172]  [0.114]  [0.089] [0.176] [0.103] [0.091] [0.175] [0.097]  [0.090] [0.162] [0.008] [0.007] [0.009] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] 
2002 0.762 1.039 0.962  0.552  0.736 0.709 0.317 0.490 0.535 0.132 0.194 0.230 0.033 0.033 0.028 -0.001 0.000  0.000 
  [0.094]  [0.052] [0.100]  [0.086]  [0.050] [0.103] [0.086] [0.047] [0.099] [0.081]  [0.044] [0.099] [0.006] [0.004] [0.006] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] 
2003 0.788 1.110 0.965  0.579  0.827 0.715 0.300 0.562 0.466 0.167 0.332 0.315 0.027 0.031 0.035 0.000 0.000  -0.001 
  [0.070]  [0.066] [0.127]  [0.080]  [0.066] [0.125] [0.073] [0.066] [0.125] [0.064]  [0.061] [0.127] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] 
Source: NBS urban household survey, 1988-2003 
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Table 11. Quantile-JMP Decomposition of male earning inequality into price and quantity components, 1988-1997-2003    (100×log point changes) 
Earning differentials:  90-10  90-50  50-10  90-10 90-50 50-10 90-10 90-50 50-10 
Periods: 1988-2003  1988-1997  1997-2003 
Log Earning points  59.1 40.3  18.8 54.5 47.9  6.6  4.6  -7.6  12.2 
Constant 9.2  33.8  -24.7  31.5  23.1  8.4  -22.3  10.8  -33.1 
Region 27.5  4.9  22.6  38.2  22.1  16.1  -10.7  -17.2  6.4 
Education 20.6  3.6  17  -7.3  -7.3  0  27.9  10.8  17.1 
Experience  1.9  -2 3.8 -7.8  10 -17.9 9.7  -12 21.7 
Sequence  X-B-W W-B-X X-B-W  W-B-X X-B-W  W-B-X  X-B-W W-B-X X-B-W W-B-X X-B-W W-B-X X-B-W W-B-X X-B-W W-B-X X-B-W W-B-X 
Quantity changes    -36.8  -3.3  -4.4  4.8  -32.3  -8.1 -20.5  -5.3  4.9  8.5 -25.4  -13.8 -23.5  -9.4 -17.4  -9.2  -6.1  -0.2 
Constant  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 
Region  -7.0  3.6  -5.2  0.5  -1.8  3.2 4.2  13.2 3.9 7.7 0.2  5.4  -20.7  -12.7  -16.9 -9.9  -3.8  -2.7 
Education  1.3  8.5  1.5  4.8  -0.2  3.7  -0.6 -1.4 0.9 0.8  -1.5 -2.2 2.2  6.4 0.2  1.1 2.0 5.2 
Experience  -31.0 -15.4  -0.7  -0.4  -30.3  -15.0  -24.0  -17.0 0.1 0.0  -24.1  -17.0  -5.0 -3.1  -0.7 -0.4  -4.3  -2.7 
Between Group 
Prices 
34.0  16.0  21.1  10.3  12.9  5.7  30.9  15.7  22.6  15.5 8.2  0.2 8.7  0.9 3.3 -1.7 5.3 2.6 
Constant  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 
Region  22.4  16.4  15.5  10.2 6.9  6.2  32.3 22.7  22.3 16.2  10.1  6.5 -1.9  -5.7 -1.4  -5.0 -0.5 -0.6 
Education  12.3  4.5  5.7  0.5  6.6  4.1 1.5  1.1 1.0 0.0 0.6  1.1  10.0  5.5 4.5  3.0 5.5 2.4 
Experience  -0.8  -4.9  -0.1  -0.4  -0.6 -4.5  -3.0 -8.0  -0.6  -0.7  -2.4 -7.4 0.5  1.1 0.2  0.3 0.4 0.8 
Within Group Prices  61.9  46.4  23.7  25.2  38.2  21.1 44.2  44.1 20.4 23.9 23.8  20.2 19.4  13.1  6.5  3.3 13.0  9.7 
Constant  9.2  9.2  33.8  33.8  -24.7 -24.7 31.5  31.5 23.1 23.1  8.4  8.4  -22.3 -22.3 10.8  10.8  -33.1  -33.1 
Region  12.1  7.5  -5.4  -5.7  17.5  13.2 1.7  2.4  -4.1  -1.9 5.8  4.3  11.9  7.6 1.2 -2.2  10.7 9.8 
Education  7.0  7.6  -3.6  -1.7  10.6  9.3  -8.2 -7.0  -9.1  -8.0 1.0  1.0  15.7  16.1 6.1  6.7 9.7 9.4 
Experience  33.6  22.2 -1.1 -1.2  34.7  23.3 19.2  17.2 10.6 10.7  8.6  6.5 14.1  11.7  -11.5 -11.9 25.6 23.6 
Source data: UHS, 1988-2003. Xbw and wbx denote the sequence of decomposition which is Quantity-Between Price-Within Price and Within Price -Between Price-Quantity 
respectively.Table 12. Quantile-JMP Decomposition of female earning inequality into price and quantity components, 1988-1997-2003. (100×log point changes) 
Earning differentials:  90-10  90-50  50-10 90-10 90-50 50-10 90-10 90-50 50-10 
Periods: 1988-2003  1988-1997  1997-2003 
Log Earning points  81.2 48.0 33.1 78.0 49.2 28.8 3.1  -1.2 4.3 
Constant  -14.1 16.8  -30.9 10.3  6.1 4.2  -24.4  10.7  -35.1 
Region  40.3 17.5 22.8 44.6 23.8 20.8 -4.2 -6.2  2.0 
Education  42.4 7.4  35.0  44.8  25.0  19.8 -2.3  -17.6  15.2 
Experience  12.4 6.3 6.2  -21.6  -5.6 -16.0  34.0  11.9  22.2 
Sequence  X-B-W W-B-X X-B-W W-B-X X-B-W W-B-X X-B-W W-B-X X-B-W W-B-X X-B-W W-B-X X-B-W W-B-X X-B-W W-B-X X-B-W W-B-X 
Quantity changes    -30.1  9.8   -10.6   -1.2  -19.6  11.1  -13.0 12.2  -1.0    11.0  -12.0  1.2  -21.3  -6.8  -18.8  -9.0   -2.6   2.3  
Constant  0.0  0.0   0.0   0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0    0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0   0.0   0.0  
Region  -6.3  9.4   -6.5   -0.6  0.2  10.1  7.3  19.8 5.4    11.0 1.8  8.8 -18.6 -10.8 -21.0  -13.5   2.4   2.8  
Education  -3.3  11.7   -0.3   3.3  -3.0  8.4  -0.4  7.3  0.0   4.3  -0.4 3.0  -2.2 3.9 0.6  2.4   -2.8   1.5  
Experience  -20.6  -11.3   -3.8   -3.9  -16.8  -7.4 -19.9 -14.9  -6.4   -4.3 -13.5 -10.6  -0.5 0.1 1.7 2.1    -2.1    -2.0   
Between Group Prices  43.9  22.3   24.1   13.4  19.7  8.9 40.3 23.3 26.0    17.6  14.2 5.6  10.8 0.9 5.4  -2.9   5.4   3.8  
Constant  0.0  0.0   0.0   0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0    0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0   0.0   0.0  
Region  29.6  16.9   15.7   9.3  13.9  7.6 35.0 23.3 23.4    16.3 11.6  7.0  1.8 -6.4 -0.1 -6.4   1.9    0.0   
Education  15.3  9.7   9.1   4.6  6.2 5.1 5.9 4.8 2.5    2.2 3.5 2.6 9.3 7.3 5.7  3.8   3.5   3.5  
Experience  -1.0  -4.3   -0.6   -0.4  -0.4 -3.9 -0.6 -4.9  0.2    -0.9 -0.8 -4.0 -0.2  0.0  -0.2  -0.3   0.0   0.3  
Within Group Prices  67.4  49.0   34.4   35.8  33.0 13.2 50.8 42.6 24.2    20.6 26.6 22.1 13.6  9.0 12.1 10.7   1.5   -1.7  
Constant  -14.1  -14.1   16.8   16.8  -30.9  -30.9 10.3 10.3  6.1    6.1 4.2 4.2  -24.4  -24.4 10.7 10.7    -35.1   -35.1  
Region  17.0  14.0   8.3   8.9  8.7  5.1 2.3 1.5  -5.0    -3.5 7.3 5.0  12.7 12.9 14.9 13.7    -2.2    -0.8   
Education  30.4  21.0   -1.4   -0.5  31.8  21.5  39.2 32.7 22.5    18.4 16.7 14.2  -9.4 -13.6 -23.9 -23.8   14.5   10.3  
Experience  34.1  28.0   10.7   10.6  23.3  17.5 -1.1 -1.8  0.6    -0.4 -1.6 -1.4 34.7 34.0 10.4 10.1   24.3   23.9  
Source data: UHS, 1988-2003. Xbw and wbx denote the sequence of decomposition which is Quantity-Between Price-Within Price and Within Price -Between Price-Quantity 
respectively.
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 Figure 1: Kernel Density Estimates
 














































1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Year
L
o
g
 
A
n
n
u
a
l
 
E
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
 
  40